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Abstract
Craig’s interpolation theorem [Craig, 1957] is an
important theorem known for propositional logic
and first-order logic. It says that if a logical
formula β logically follows from a formula α,
then there is a formula γ, including only symbols
that appear in both α, β, such that β logically
follows from γ and γ logically follows from α.
Such theorems are important and useful for un-
derstanding those logics in which they hold as
well as for speeding up reasoning with theories
in those logics. In this paper we present interpo-
lation theorems in this spirit for three nonmono-
tonic systems: circumscription, default logic and
logic programs with the stable models seman-
tics (a.k.a. answer set semantics). These results
give us better understanding of those logics, es-
pecially in contrast to their nonmonotonic char-
acteristics. They suggest that some monotonic-
ity principle holds despite the failure of classic
monotonicity for these logics. Also, they some-
times allow us to use methods for the decomposi-
tion of reasoning for these systems, possibly in-
creasing their applicability and tractability. Fi-
nally, they allow us to build structured represen-
tations that use those logics.
1 Introduction
Craig’s interpolation theorem [Craig, 1957] is an important
theorem known for propositional logic and first-order
logic (FOL). It says that if α, β are two logical formulae
and α ⊢ β, then there is a formula γ ∈ L(α) ∩ L(β)
such that α ⊢ γ and γ ⊢ β (“⊢” is the classical logical
deduction relation; L(α) is the language of α (the set
of formulae built with the nonlogical symbols of α,
L(α))). Such interpolation theorems allow us to break
inference into pieces associated with sublanguages of
the language of that theory [McIlraith and Amir, 2001],
for those formal systems in which they hold. In AI,
these properties have been used to speed up inference for
constraint satisfaction systems (CSPs), propositional logic
and FOL (e.g., [Dechter and Pearl, 1988, Darwiche, 1998,
McIlraith and Amir, 2001, Dechter and Rish, 1994,
Darwiche, 1997, Amir and McIlraith, 2000,
Dechter, 1999] and to build structured representations
[Darwiche, 1998, Amir, 2000, Darwiche, 1997]
In this paper we present interpolation theo-
rems for three nonmonotonic systems: cir-
cumscription [McCarthy, 1980], default logic
[Reiter, 1980] and logic programs with the An-
swer Set semantics [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991,
Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988]. In the nonmonotonic
setup there are several interpolation theorems for each
system, with different conditions for applicability and
different form of interpolation. This stands in con-
trast to classical logic, where Craig’s interpolation
theorem always holds. Our theorems allow us to
use methods for the decomposition of reasoning (a-la
[Amir and McIlraith, 2000, McIlraith and Amir, 2001])
under some circumstances for these systems, possibly
increasing their applicability and tractability for structured
theories. We list the main theorems that we show in
this paper below, omitting some of their conditions for
simplicity.
For circumscription we show that, under some condi-
tions, Circ[α;P ;Q] |= β iff there is some set of
formulae γ ⊆ L(α) ∩ L(β) such that α |= γ
and Circ[γ;P ;Q] |= β. For example, to answer
Circ[BlockW ; block;L(BlockW )] |= on(A,B), we can
compute this formula γ ∈ L({block, on,A,B}) from
BlockW without applying circumscription, and then solve
Circ[γ; block;L(BlockW )] |= on(A,B) (where γ may
be significantly smaller than BlockW ).
For default logic, letting α |∼D β mean that every exten-
sion of 〈α,D〉 entails β (cautious entailment), we show
that, under some conditions, if α |∼D β, then there is a
formula γ ∈ L(α ∪ D) ∩ L(β) such that α |∼D γ and
γ |∼D β. For logic programs we show that if P1, P2 are
two logic programs andϕ ∈ L(P2) such thatP1∪P2 |∼b ϕ,
then there is γ ∈ L(P1) ∩ L(P2) such that P1 |∼b γ and
P2 ∪ γ |∼b ϕ (here |∼b is the brave entailment for logic
programs).
This paper focuses on the form of the interpolation the-
orems that hold for those nonmonotonic logics. We do
not address the possible application of these results to
the problem of automated reasoning with those logics.
Nonetheless, we mention that direct application of those
results is possible along the lines already explored for
propositional logic and FOL in [Amir and McIlraith, 2000,
McIlraith and Amir, 2001].
No interpolation theorems were shown for nonmonotonic
reasoning systems before this paper. Nonetheless, some of
our theorems for default logic and logic programs are close
to the splitting theorems of [Lifschitz and Turner, 1994,
Turner, 1996], which have already been used to decompose
reasoning for those logics. The main difference between
our theorems and those splitting theorems is that the latter
change some of the defaults/rules involved to provide the
corresponding entailment. Also, they do not talk about an
interpolant γ, but rather discuss combining extensions.
Since its debut, the nonmonotonic reasoning line of work
has expanded and several textbooks now exist that give
a fair view of nonmonotonic reasoning and its uses (e.g.,
[Gabbay et al., 1993]). The reader is referred to those
books for background and further details.
2 Logical Preliminaries
In this paper, we use the notion of logical theory for every
set of axioms in FOL or propositional logic, regardless of
whether the set of axioms is deductively closed or not. We
use L(A) to denote the signature of A, i.e., the set of non-
logical symbols. L(A) denotes the language of A, i.e., the
set of formulae built withL(A). Cn(A) is the set of logical
consequences of A (i.e., those formulae that are valid con-
sequences of A in FOL). For a first-order structure, M , in
L, we write U(M) for the universe of elements of M . For
every symbol, s, in L, we write sM for the interpretation of
s in M .
Finally, we note Craig’s Interpolation Theorem.
Theorem 2.1 ([Craig, 1957]) Let α, β be sentences such
that α ⊢ β. Then there is a formula γ involving only non-
logical symbols common to both α and β, such that α ⊢ γ
and γ ⊢ β.
3 Circumscription
3.1 McCarthy’s Circumscription: Overview
McCarthy’s circumscription [McCarthy, 1980,
McCarthy, 1986] is a nonmonotonic reasoning system in
which inference from a set of axioms, A, is performed
by minimizing the extent of some predicate symbols −→P ,
while allowing some other nonlogical symbols,−→Z to vary.
Formally, McCarthy’s circumscription formula
Circ[A(P,Z);P ;Z] =
A(P,Z) ∧ ∀p, z (A(p, z)⇒ ¬(p < P ))
(1)
says that in the theoryA, with parameter relations and func-
tion vectors (sequence of symbols) P,Z , P is a minimal
element such that A(P,Z) is still consistent, when we are
allowed to vary Z in order to allow P to become smaller.
Take for example the following simple theory:
T = block(B1) ∧ block(B2)
Then, the circumscription of block in T , varying nothing,
is
Circ[T ; block; ] = T ∧ ∀p [T[block/p] ⇒ ¬(p < block)].
Roughly, this means that block is a minimal predicate satis-
fying T . Computing circumscription is discussed in length
in [Lifschitz, 1993] and others, and we do not expand on it
here. Using known techniques we can conclude
Circ[T ; block; ] ≡ ∀x (block(x)⇔ (x = B1 ∨ x = B2))
This means that there are no other blocks in the world other
than those mentioned in the original theory T .
We give the preferential semantics for circumscrip-
tion that was given by [Lifschitz, 1985, McCarthy, 1986,
Etherington, 1986] in the following definition.
Definition 3.1 ([Lifschitz, 1985]) For any two models M
and N of a theory T we write M ≤P,Z N if the models
M,N differ only in how they interpret predicates from P
and Z and if the extension of every predicate from P in M
is a subset of its extension in N . We write M <P,Z N if
for at least one predicate in P the extension inM is a strict
subset of its extension in N .
We say that a modelM of T is ≤P,Z-minimal if there is no
model N such that N <P,Z M .
Theorem 3.2 ([Lifschitz, 1985]: Circumscript. Semantics)
Let T be a finite set of sentences. A structure M is a model
of Circ[T ;P ;Z] iff M is a ≤P,Z-minimal model of T .
This theorem allows us to extend the definition of circum-
scription to set of infinite number of sentences. In those
cases, Circ[T ;P ;Z] is defined as the set of sentences that
hold in all the ≤P,Z-minimal models of T . Theorem 3.2
implies that this extended definition is equivalent to the
syntactic characterization of the original definition (equa-
tion (1)) if T is a finite set of sentences. In the rest of this
paper, we refer to this extended definition of circumscrip-
tion, if T is an infinite set of FOL sentences (we will note
those cases when we encounter them).
Circumscription satisfied Left Logical Equivalence (LLE):
T ≡ T ′ implies that Circ[T ;P ;Z] ≡ Circ[T ′;P ;Z]. It
also satisfies Right Weakening (RW): Circ[T ;P ;Z] |= ϕ
and ϕ⇒ ψ implies that Circ[T ;P ;Z] |= ψ).
3.2 Model Theory
Definition 3.3 Let M,N be L-structures, for FOL signa-
ture L and language L. We say that N is an elemen-
tary extension of M (or M is an elementary substruc-
ture of N ), written M  N , if U(M) ⊆ U(N) and for
every ϕ(−→x ) ∈ L and vector of elements −→a of U(M),
M |= ϕ(−→a ) iff N |= ϕ(−→a ).
f : M → N is an elementary embedding if f is an injective
(one-to-one) homomorphism from M to N and for every
ϕ(−→x ) ∈ L and vector −→a = 〈a1, ..., an〉 of elements from
U(M) (i.e., a1, .., an ∈ U(M)), M |= ϕ(−→a ) iff N |=
ϕ(f(a1), ..., f(an)).
For FOL signatures L ⊆ L+, and for N an L+-structure,
we say that N ↾ L is the reduct of N to L, the L-structure
with the same universe of elements as N , and the same
interpretation as N for those symbols from L+ that are in
L (there is no interpretation for symbols not in L). For A
theory T in a language of L+, let CnL(T ) be the set of all
consequences of T in the language of L.
The following theorem is a model-theoretic property that is
analogous to Craig’s interpolation theorem (Theorem 2.1).
Theorem 3.4 (See [Hodges, 1997] p.148) Let L,L+ be
FOL signatures with L ⊆ L+ and T a theory in the lan-
guage of L+. Let M be an L-structure. Then, M |=
CnL(T ) if and only if for some modelN of T ,M  N ↾ L
(M is an elementary substructure of the reduct of N to L).
3.3 Interpolation in Circumscription
In this section we present two interpolation theorems for
circumscription. Those theorems hold for both FOL and
propositional logic. Roughly speaking, the first (Theorem
3.8) says that if α nonmonotonically entails β (here this
means Circ[α;P ;Q] |= β), then there is γ ⊆ L(α) ∩
L(β ∪ P ) such that α classically entails γ (α |= γ) and
γ nonmonotonically entails β (Circ[γ;P ;Q] |= β). In the
FOL case this γ can be an infinite set of sentences, and we
use the extended definition of Circumscription for infinite
sets of axioms for this statement.
The second theorem (Theorem 3.11) is similar to the first,
with two main differences. First, it requires that L(α) ⊆
(P ∪ Q). Second, it guarantees that γ as above (and some
other restrictions) exists iff α nonmonotonically entails β.
This is in contrast to the first theorem that guarantees only
that if part. The actual technical details are more fine than
those rough statements, so the reader should refer to the
actual theorem statements.
In addition to these two theorems, we present another theo-
rem that addresses the case of reasoning from the union of
theories (Theorem 3.10). Before we state and prove those
theorems, we prove several useful lemmas.
Our first lemma says that if we are given two theories
T1, T2, and we know the set of sentences that follow from
T2 in the intersection of their languages, then every model
of this set of sentences together with T1 can be extended to
a model of T1 ∪ T2.
Lemma 3.5 Let T1, T2 be two theories, with signatures in
L1, L2, respectively. Let γ be a set of sentences logically
equivalent to CnL1∩L2(T2). For every L1-structure, M,
that satisfies T1 ∪γ there is a (L1∪L2)-structure, M̂, that
is a model of T1 ∪ T2 such thatM M̂ ↾ L1.
PROOF Let M be a L1-structure that is a model of
T1 ∪ γ. Then M |= γ. Noticing that γ is logically equiva-
lent to CnL1∩L2(T2) (by definition of γ), we get that γ |=
CnL1∩L2(T2). Consequently, γ |= CnL1(T2) because
CnL1∩L2(T2) ≡ CnL1(CnL1∩L2(T2)) = CnL1(T2).
Now we use Theorem 3.4 with L = L1, L+ = L1 ∪ L2,
M = M and T = T1 ∪ T2. We know that M |= T1 ∪
γ. Thus, M |= T1 ∪ CnL1(T2). To use Theorem 3.4 we
need to show that M |= CnL1(T1 ∪ T2). We use Craig’s
interpolation theorem (Theorem 2.1) to show this is indeed
the case.
First notice thatCnL1(T1∪T2) ⊇ CnL1(T1∪γ) is true be-
cause T2 |= γ. We show thatCnL1(T1∪T2) ⊆ CnL1(T1∪
γ). Take ϕ ∈ CnL1(T1 ∪ T2). By definition, T1 ∪ T2 |= ϕ
and ϕ ∈ L(T1). The deduction theorem for FOL implies
that T2 |= T ′1 ⇒ ϕ, for some finite subset T ′1 ⊆ T1.
Craig’s interpolation theorem for FOL implies that there
is δ ∈ L(T2) ∩ L(T ′1 ⇒ ϕ) = L(T2) ∩ L(T1) such that
T2 |= δ and δ |= T ′1 ⇒ ϕ. Thus, δ ∈ CnL1∩L2(T2) ≡ γ.
Consequently, γ |= T ′1 ⇒ ϕ. Using the deduction theorem
again we get that T ′1 ∪ γ |= ϕ, implying that T1 ∪ γ |= ϕ.
Thus, we showed that CnL1(T1 ∪ T2) = CnL1(T1 ∪ γ).
FromM |= T1∪CnL1(T2) and γ = CnL1(T2) we get that
M |= CnL1(T1 ∪ T2).
Finally, the conditions of Theorem 3.4 for L = L1, L+ =
L1 ∪ L2, M = M and T = T1 ∪ T2 hold. We conclude
that there is a (L1 ∪ L2)-structure, M̂, that is a model of
T1 ∪ T2 such that M M̂ ↾ L1.
Our second lemma says that every<P,Q-minimal model of
T that is also a model of T ′ is a <P,Q-minimal model of
T ∪ T ′.
Lemma 3.6 Let T be a theory and P,Q vectors of nonlog-
ical symbols. If M |= Circ[T ;P ;Q] and M |= T ∪ T ′,
then M |= Circ[T ∪ T ′;P ;Q].
PROOF Let M be a model of T ∪ T ′ such that M |=
Circ[T ;P ;Q]. If there is M′ <P,Q M such that M′ |=
T ∪ T ′, then M′ |= T and M 6|= Circ[T ;P ;Q]. Contra-
diction. Thus, there is no such M′ and M |= Circ[T ∪
T ′;P ;Q].
The following theorem is central to the rest of our results
in this section. It says that when we circumscribe P,Q in
T1 ∪ T2 we can replace T2 by its consequences in L(T1),
for some purposes and under some assumptions.
Theorem 3.7 Let T1, T2 be two theories and P,Q two
vectors of symbols from L(T1) ∪ L(T2) such that P ⊆
L(T1). Let γ a set of sentences logically equivalent to
CnL(T1)∩L(T2)(T2). Then, for all ϕ ∈ L(T1), if Circ[T1 ∪
T2;P ;Q] |= ϕ, then Circ[T1 ∪ γ;P ;Q] |= ϕ.
PROOF We show that for every model of Circ[T1 ∪
γ;P ;Q] there is a model of Circ[T1 ∪ T2;P ;Q] whose
reduct to L(T1) is an elementary extension of the reduct of
the first model to L(T1).
Let M be a L(T1 ∪ T2)-structure that is a model of
Circ[T1 ∪ γ;P ;Q]. Then, M |= T1 ∪ γ. From Lemma
3.5 we know that there is a (L1 ∪L2)-structure, M̂, that is
a model of T2 such that M ↾ L(T1)  M̂ ↾ L(T1).
Thus, M̂ is a ≤P,Q-minimal model of T1 ∪ γ. To see this,
assume otherwise. Then, there is a modelM′ for the signa-
ture L(T1 ∪T2) such thatM′ <P,Q M̂ andM′ |= T1 ∪γ.
Take M′′ such that the interpretation of all the symbols
in L(T1) is exactly the same as that of M′ and such that
the interpretation of all symbols in L(T2) \ L(T1) is ex-
actly the same as that of M. Then,M′′ |= T1 ∪ γ because
T1∪γ ⊆ L(T1). Also,M′′ <P,Q′ M, forQ′ = Q∩L(T1)
because P ⊆ L(T1) andM,M̂ agree on the interpretation
of symbols in L(T1) (M ↾ L(T1)  M̂ ↾ L(T1)). Thus,
M′′ <P,Q M, since M′′,M agree on all the interpre-
tation of all symbols in L(T2) \ L(T1). This contradicts
M |= Circ[T1∪γ;P ;Q], so M̂ is a≤P,Q-minimal model
of T1 ∪ γ.
Thus, M̂ |= Circ[T1 ∪ γ;P ;Q], and M̂ |= T1 ∪ T2. From
Lemma 3.6 we get that M̂ |= Circ[T1 ∪ T2;P ;Q].
Now, let ϕ ∈ L(T1) such that Circ[T1 ∪ T2;P ;Q] |= ϕ.
Then every model of Circ[T1 ∪ T2;P ;Q] satisfies ϕ. Let
M be a model ofCirc[T1∪γ;P ;Q] in the languageL(T1∪
T2). Then there is M̂ as above, i.e., M̂ |= Circ[T1 ∪
T2;P ;Q] and M ↾ L(T1)  M̂ ↾ L(T1). Thus, M̂ |= ϕ.
Since M ↾ L(T1)  M̂ ↾ L(T1), M |= ϕ. Thus every
model of Circ[T1 ∪ γ;P ;Q] is a model of ϕ.
Theorem 3.8 (Interpolation for Circumscription 1) Let
T be a theory, P,Q vectors of symbols, and ϕ a formula.
If Circ[T ;P ;Q] |= ϕ, then there is γ ⊆ L(T )∩L(ϕ ∪ P )
such that
T |= γ and Circ[γ;P ;Q] |= ϕ.
Furthermore, this γ can be logically equivalent to the con-
sequences of T in L(T ) ∩ L(ϕ ∪ P ).
PROOF We use Theorem 3.7 to find this γ. For T, ϕ as
in the statement of the theorem we define T1, T2 as follows.
We choose T1 such that ϕ ∈ L(T1) and P ⊆ L(T1): Let
T1 = {ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ} ∪ τ1 for τ1 a set of tautologies such that
L(τ1) = P . We choose T2 such that it includes T and has a
rich enough vocabulary so that P,Q ⊆ L(T1)∪L(T2). Let
T2 = T ∪ τ2, for τ2 a set of tautologies such that L(τ2) =
Q \ L(T1). Let L1 = L(T1), L2 = L(T2).
Theorem 3.7 guarantees that if P ⊆ L1 then γ from that
theorem satisfies Circ[T1 ∪ T2;P ;Q] |= ψ ⇒ Circ[T1 ∪
γ;P ;Q] |= ψ for every ψ ∈ L(T1). This implies that
for every ψ ∈ L({ϕ} ∪ τ1), Circ[T ;P ;Q] |= ψ ⇒
Circ[γ;P ;Q] |= ψ. In particular, Circ[γ;P ;Q] |= ϕ,
and this γ satisfies our current theorem.
This theorem does not hold if we require γ ⊆ L(T )∩L(ϕ)
instead of γ ⊆ L(T )∩L(ϕ∪P ). For example, take ϕ = Q,
T = {¬P ⇒ Q}, where P,Q are propositional symbols.
Circ[T ;P ;Q] |= ϕ. However, every logical consequence
of T in L(ϕ) is a tautology. Thus, if the theorem was cor-
rect with our changed requirement, γ would be equivalent
to ∅ and Circ[γ;P ;Q] 6|= ϕ.
Theorem 3.9 Let T1, T2 be two theories, P,Q two vectors
of symbols from L(T1) ∪ L(T2) such that P ⊆ L(T1) and
P ∪ Q ⊇ L(T2). Let γ be a set of sentences logically
equivalent toCnL(T1)∩L(T2)(T2). Then, for all ϕ ∈ L(T1),
if Circ[T1 ∪ γ;P ;Q] |= ϕ, then Circ[T1 ∪ T2;P ;Q] |= ϕ.
PROOF We show that every model of Circ[T1 ∪
T2;P ;Q] is also a model ofCirc[T1∪γ;P ;Q]. LetM be a
L(T1∪T2)-structure that is a model ofCirc[T1∪T2;P ;Q].
ThenM |= T1 ∪ T2, implying that also M |= T1 ∪ γ.
Assume that there isM′ <P,Q M such thatM′ |= T1∪γ.
From Lemma 3.5, there is M¯′ such that M¯′ |= T1 ∪ T2
and M′ ↾ L(T1)  M¯′ ↾ L(T1). Since M′,M¯′ agree
on all the symbols of L(T1), we get that M¯′ ≤P,Q M′
(because P ∪ Q ⊇ L(T2)). Finally, we get that M¯′ ≤P,Q
M′ <P,Q M, contradicting the assumption of M being
≤P,Q-minimal satisfying T1 ∪ T2. Thus, M is a model of
Circ[T1 ∪ γ;P ;Q].
Now, let ϕ ∈ L(T1) such that Circ[T1 ∪ γ;P ;Q] |= ϕ.
Then every model ofCirc[T1∪γ;P ;Q] satisfies ϕ. LetM
be a model of Circ[T1 ∪ T2;P ;Q] in the language L(T1 ∪
T2). Then, M |= Circ[T1 ∪ γ;P ;Q] and M |= ϕ. Thus,
Circ[T1 ∪ T2;P ;Q] |= ϕ.
From Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 3.9 we get the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.10 (Interpolation Between Theories) Let
T1, T2 be two theories, P,Q vectors of symbols in
L(T1) ∪L(T2) such that P ⊆ L(T1) and P ∪Q ⊃ L(T2).
Let γ be a set of sentences logically equivalent to
CnL(T1)∩L(T2)(T2). Then, for every ϕ ∈ L(T1),
Circ[T1 ∪ γ;P ;Q] |= ϕ ⇐⇒ Circ[T1 ∪ T2;P ;Q] |= ϕ
Theorem 3.11 (Interpolation for Circumscription 2)
Let T be a theory, P,Q vectors of symbols such that
(P ∪ Q) ⊇ L(T ). Let L2 be a set of nonlogical symbols.
Then, there is γ ∈ L(T ) ∩ L(L2 ∪ P ) such that T |= γ
and for all ϕ ∈ L(L2),
Circ[T ;P ;Q] |= ϕ ⇐⇒ Circ[γ;P ;Q] |= ϕ.
Furthermore, this γ can be logically equivalent to the con-
sequences of T in L(T ) ∩ (L2 ∪ P ).
PROOF Let T1 be a set of tautologies such that L(T1) =
L2 ∪ P . Also, let T2 = T ∪ τ2, for τ2 a set of tautologies
such that L(τ2) = Q \ L(T1). Let L1 = L(T1), L2 =
L(T2). Theorem 3.10 guarantees that γ from that theorem
satisfies Circ[γ;P ;Q] |= ψ ⇐⇒ Circ[T ;P ;Q] |= ψ for
every ψ ∈ L1 = L2 ∪ P .
The theorems we presented are for parallel circumscription,
where we minimize all the minimized predicates in parallel
without priorities. The case of prioritized circumscription
is outside the scope of this paper.
4 Default Logic
In this section we present interpolation theorems for propo-
sitional default logic. We also assume that the signature of
our propositional default theories is finite (this also implies
that our theories are finite).
4.1 Reiter’s Default Logic: Overview
In Reiter’s default logic [Reiter, 1980] one has a set of facts
W (in either propositional or FOL) and a set of defaults
D (in a corresponding language). Defaults in D are of
the form α:β1,...,βnδ with the intuition that if α is proved,
and β1, ..., βn are consistent (throughout the proof), then
δ is proved. α is called the prerequisite, pre(d) = {α};
β1, ..., βn are the justifications, just(d) = {β1, ..., βn} and
δ is the consequent, cons(d) = {δ}. We use similar nota-
tion for sets of defaults (e.g., cons(D) = ⋃d∈D cons(d)).
Notice that the justifications are checked for consistency
one at a time (and not conjoined).
Take, for example, the following default theory T =
〈W,D〉:
D = {
bird(x) : fly(x)
fly(x)
} W = {bird(Tweety)} (2)
Intuitively, this theory says that birds normally fly and that
Tweety is a bird.
An extension of 〈W,D〉 is a set of sentences E that satis-
fies W , follows the defaults in D, and is minimal. More
formally, E is an extension if it is minimal (as a set) such
that Γ(E) = E, where we define Γ(S0) to be S, a minimal
set of sentences such that
1. W ⊆ S; S = Cn(S).
2. For all α:β1,...,βnδ ∈ D if α ∈ S and ∀i ¬βi /∈ S0, then
δ ∈ S.
The following theorem provides an equivalent defini-
tion that was shown in [Marek and Truszczyn´ski, 1993,
Risch and Schwind, 1994, Baader and Hollunder, 1995].
A set of defaults, D is grounded in a set of formulae
W iff for all d ∈ D, pre(d) ∈ CnMon(D)(W ), where
Mon(D) = { pre(d)cons(d) | d ∈ D}.
Theorem 4.1 (Extensions in Terms of Generating Defaults)
A set of formulae E is an extension of a default theory
〈W,D〉 iff E = Cn(W ∪ {cons(d) | d ∈ D′}) for a
minimal set of defaults D′ ⊆ D such that
1. D′ is grounded in W and
2. for all d ∈ D:
d ∈ D′ iff pre(d) ∈ Cn(W ∪ cons(D′)) and
for all ψ ∈ just(d),¬ψ /∈ Cn(W ∪ cons(D′)).
Every minimal set of defaultsD′ ⊆ D as mentioned in this
theorem is said to be a set of generating defaults.
Normal defaults are defaults of the form α:ββ . These de-
faults are interesting because they are fairly intuitive in na-
ture (if we proved α then β is proved unless previously
proved inconsistent). We say that a default theory is nor-
mal, if all of its defaults are normal.
We define W |∼D ϕ as cautious entailment sanctioned by
the defaults in D, i.e., ϕ follows from every extension of
〈W,D〉. We define W |∼bD ϕ as brave entailment sanc-
tioned by the defaults inD, i.e., ϕ follows from at least one
extension of 〈W,D〉.
4.2 Interpolation in Default Logic
In this section we present several flavors of interpolation
theorems, most of which are stated for cautious entailment.
Theorem 4.2 (Interpolation for Cautious DL 1) Let
T = 〈W,D〉 be a propositional default theory and ϕ a
propositional formula. If W |∼D ϕ, then there are γ1, γ2
such that γ1 ∈ L(W )∩L(D∪{ϕ}), γ2 ∈ L(W∪D)∩L(ϕ)
and all the following hold:
W |= γ1 γ1 |∼D γ2 γ2 |= ϕ
W |∼D γ2 γ1 |∼D ϕ
PROOF Let γ1 be the set of consequences of W in
L(D ∪ {ϕ}) ∩ L(W ). Let E be the set of extensions of
〈W,D〉 and E′ the set of extensions of 〈γ1, D〉. We show
that every extension E′ ∈ E′ has an extension E ∈ E such
that Cn(E′ ∪W ) = Cn(E). This will show that γ1 is as
needed.
Take E′ ∈ E′ and define E0 = Cn(E′ ∪W ). We assume
that L(E′) ⊆ L(D) because otherwise we can take a log-
ically equivalent extension whose sentences are in L(D).
We show that E0 satisfies the conditions for extensions of
〈W,D〉:
1. W ⊆ E0,
2. For all α:β1,...,βnδ ∈ D, if α ∈ E0 and ∀i ¬βi /∈ E0,
then δ ∈ E0.
The first condition holds by definition of E0. The sec-
ond condition holds because every default that is consistent
withE0 is also consistent withE′ and vice versa. We detail
the second condition below.
For the first direction (every default that is consistent with
E0 is also consistent with E′), let α:β1,...,βnδ ∈ D be such
that α ∈ E0. We show that α ∈ E′.
By definition,α ∈ L(D). α ∈ E0 implies thatE′∪W |= α
because Cn(E′ ∪W ) = E0. Using the deduction theorem
for propositional logic we get W |= E′ ⇒ α (taking E′
here to be a finite set of sentences that is logically equiva-
lent to E′ in L(D) (there is such a finite set because we as-
sume that L(D) is finite)). Using Craig’s interpolation the-
orem for propositional logic, there is γ ∈ L(W )∩L(E′ ⇒
α) such that W |= γ and γ |= E′ ⇒ α. However,
this means that γ1 |= γ, by the way we chose γ1. Thus
γ1 |= E′ ⇒ α. Since E′ ⊆ γ1 we get that E′ |= α. Since
E′ = Cn(E′) we get that α ∈ E′.
The case is similar for δ: if δ ∈ E0 then δ ∈ E′ by the same
argument as given above for α ∈ E0 ⇒ α ∈ E′. Finally, if
∀i ¬βi /∈ E0 then ∀i ¬βi /∈ E′ because E′ ⊆ E0.
The opposite direction (every default that is consistent with
E′ is also consistent with E0) is similar to the first one.
Thus,E0 satisfies those two conditions. However, it is pos-
sible that E0 is not a minimal such set of formulae. If so,
Theorem 4.1 implies that there is a strict subset of the gen-
erating defaults of E0 that generate a different extension.
However, we can apply this new set of defaults to generate
an extension that is smaller than E′, contradicting the fact
that E′ is an extension of 〈γ1, D〉.
Now, if ϕ logically follows in all the extensions of 〈W,D〉
then it must also follow from every extension of 〈γ1, D〉
together with W . Let Λ = E1 ∨ ... ∨ En, for E1, ..., En
the (finite) set of (logically non-equivalent) extensions of
〈W,D〉 (we have a finite set of those becauseL(W )∪L(D)
is finite). Then, Λ |= ϕ. Take γ2 ∈ L(Λ) ∩ L(ϕ) such that
Λ |= γ2 and γ2 |= ϕ, as guaranteed by Craig’s interpolation
theorem (Theorem 2.1). These γ1, γ2 are those promised
by the current theorem: W |= γ1, γ2 |= ϕ, W |∼D γ2,
γ1 |∼D γ2 and γ1 |∼D ϕ.
Theorem 4.3 (Interpolation for Cautious DL 2) Let
T = 〈W,D〉 be a propositional default theory and ϕ
a propositional formula. If W |∼D ϕ, then there are
γ1, γ2 ∈ L(W ) ∩ L(D), and all the following hold:
W |= γ1 γ1 |∼D γ2
{γ2} ∪W |= ϕ W |∼D γ2
The proof is similar to the one for Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 4.4 Let 〈W,D〉 be a default theory and ϕ a
formula. If W |∼D ϕ, then there is a set of formulae,
γ ∈ L(W ∪D) ∩ L(ϕ) such that W |∼D γ and γ |∼D ϕ.
PROOF Follows immediately from Theorem 4.2 with γ2
there corresponding to our needed γ.
It is interesting to note that we do not get stronger inter-
polation theorems for prerequisite-free normal default the-
ories. [Imielinski, 1987] provided a modular translation of
normal default theories with no prerequisites into circum-
scription, but Theorem 3.8 does not lead to better results.
In particular, the counter example that we presented after
that theorem can be massaged to apply here too.
Theorem 4.5 (Interpolation Between Default Extensions)
Let 〈W1, D1〉, 〈W2, D2〉 be default theories such that
L(cons(D2)) ∩ L(pre(D1) ∪ just(D1) ∪W1) = ∅. Let
ϕ be a formula such that ϕ ∈ L(W2 ∪ D2). If there is an
extension E of 〈W1∪W2, D1∪D2〉 in which ϕ holds, then
there is a formula γ ∈ L(W1∪D1)∩L(W2∪D2), an exten-
sionE1 of 〈W1, D1〉 such thatCn(E1)∩L(W2∪D2) = γ,
and an extension E2 of 〈W2 ∪ {γ}, D2〉 such thatE2 |= ϕ.
PROOF Let D′1 ⊆ D1 be the set of generating defaults
of E that belong to D1. Notice that these defaults are
grounded in W1 because there is no information that may
have come from applying the rest of the generating defaults
in E (we required that cons(D2)∩ (pre(D1)∪just(D1)∪
W ) = ∅). Let E1 be the extension of 〈W1, D1〉 defined
using the generating defaults in D′1.
Let γ ∈ L(W1 ∪ D1) ∩ L(W2 ∪ D2) be the conjunction
of the sentences in that language that follow from E1. Let
D′2 ⊆ D2 be the set of generating defaults ofE that belong
to D2. Notice that these defaults are grounded in W2 ∪ γ
because there is no information thatD′1 may contribute that
is not already in γ (we required that cons(D2)∩(pre(D1)∪
just(D1) ∪W ) = ∅). Let E2 be the extension of 〈W2 ∪
γ,D2〉 defined with the generating defaults in D′2.
Now, E1 ∪ E2 ≡ E, and γ is the set of sentences that fol-
low from E1 in L(E1) ∩ L(E2 ∪ ϕ). E2 |= ϕ because
of Craig’s interpolation theorem (Theorem 2.1) for propo-
sitional logic: E1 ∪ E2 |= ϕ implies that E1 |= E2 ⇒ ϕ,
and Craig’s interpolation theorem guarantees the existence
of γ′ ∈ L(E1) ∩ L(E2 ∪ ϕ) such that E1 |= γ′ and
γ′ |= E2 ⇒ ϕ. Thus, γ′ ∈ γ and γ |= E2 ⇒ ϕ. This
implies γ ∪ E2 |= ϕ which implies that E2 |= ϕ.
It is interesting to notice that the reverse direction of this
theorem does not hold. For example, if we have two ex-
tensions E1, E2 as in the theorem statement, it is possible
that E1 uses a default with justification β, but W2 |= ¬β.
Strengthening the condition of the theorem, i.e., demanding
that L(W2∪cons(D2))∩L(pre(D1)∪just(D1)∪W1) =
∅, is not sufficient either. For example, if D1 includes two
defaults d1 = :a⇒¬β , and d2 =
:β
ϕ , W1 = ∅, D2 includes
no defaults and W2 = {a} then there is no extension of
〈W1 ∪W2, D1 ∪D2〉 that implies ϕ, for ϕ = {c}.
Further strengthening the conditions of the theorem gives
the following:
Theorem 4.6 (Reverse Direction of Theorem 4.5)
Let 〈W1, D1〉, 〈W2, D2〉 be default theories such that
L(W2 ∪ cons(D2)) ∩ L(D1 ∪ W1) = ∅. Let ϕ be a
formula such that ϕ ∈ L(W2 ∪D2). There is an extension
E of 〈W1 ∪W2, D1 ∪D2〉 in which ϕ holds only if there is
a formula γ ∈ L(W1 ∪ D1) ∩ L(W2 ∪D2), an extension
E1 of 〈W1, D1〉 such that Cn(E1) ∩ L(W2 ∪ D2) = γ,
and an extension E2 of 〈W2 ∪ {γ}, D2〉 such thatE2 |= ϕ.
PROOF Let E1, E2 be as in the statement of the theo-
rem. Let pi1, pi2 be the sets of defaults applied in E1, E2,
respectively. Let E = Cn(E1 ∪ E2), and let pi = pi1 ∪ pi2.
We show that E is an extension of 〈W1 ∪ W2, D1 ∪ D2〉
such that E |= ϕ as needed.
First, E ⊇ W1 ∪ W2 by E’s definition. For every d =
α:β1,...,βn
γd
∈ pi, α and γd hold because they hold in one of
E1, E2 (d ∈ pi = pi1 ∪ pi2). Assume that βi ∈ E for some
i ≤ n. Then, E1 ∪ E2 |= ¬βi, implying that E1 |= E2 ⇒
¬βi (we treatE1, E2 here as finite sets of formulae because
they are in propositional logic).
If d ∈ pi1, then clearly ¬βi ∈ L(W1 ∪D1). E1 ∪ {βi} |=
¬E2. Using Craig’s interpolation theorem we get that
γ from the theorem’s statement satisfies {γ} ∪ {βi} |=
¬E2. Consequently, E2 |= γ ⇒ ¬βi. However, E2 =
Cn(cons(pi2) ∪ W2 ∪ {γ}), and L(W2 ∪ cons(D2)) ∩
L(W1 ∪ D1) = ∅. This means that L(cons(pi2) ∪W2) ∩
L(γ ∧ βi) = ∅, implying that γ |= ¬β, contradicting
¬β /∈ E1.
If d ∈ pi2, then ¬βi ∈ L(W2 ∪ D2). Since E1 |= E2 ⇒
¬βi, we get from Craig’s interpolation theorem that γ |=
E2 ⇒ ¬βi. However, γ ∈ E2 by the definition of E2.
Thus, E2 |= ¬β, contradicting the fact that d is a default
applied in E2.
In conclusion, ¬β /∈ E. Thus, all the defaults in pi are
applied in E. It is also simple to see that no other default is
applied in E.
If there is a default d = α:β1,...,βnγd ∈ D1 that should apply
in E but is not in pi, then its preconditions and justifications
hold in E. However, this means that α follows from E1 ∪
E2, and E2 = Cn(cons(pi2) ∪W2 ∪ {γ}). Similar to the
argument above we get that E1 |= α. Similarly, we get that
if βi /∈ E then E1 6|= ¬βi, implying that d should have
applied in E1, contradicting the fact thatE1 is an extension
of 〈W1, D1〉.
If there is a default d = α:β1,...,βnγd ∈ D2 that should apply
in E but is not in pi, then its preconditions and justifications
hold in E. A similar argument to the one above shows that
it should have applied in E2 too, contradicting the fact that
E2 is an extension.
Minimality of E follows from that of E1, E2. Thus, E is
an extension of 〈W1 ∪W2, D1 ∪D2〉 as needed.
Corollary 4.7 (Interpolation for Brave DL) Let
〈W1, D1〉, 〈W2, D2〉 be default theories such that
L(cons(D2)) ∩ L(pre(D1) ∪ just(D1) ∪ W1) = ∅.
Let ϕ be a formula such that ϕ ∈ L(W2 ∪ D2).
If W1 ∪ W2 |∼bD1∪D2 ϕ, then there is a formula,
γ ∈ L(W1 ∪ D1) ∩ L(W2 ∪ D2), such that W1 |∼bD1 γ
and W2 ∪ {γ} |∼bD2 ϕ.
Corollary 4.7 does not hold for the cautious case (where
we look at all the extensions and choose ϕ and γ satisfied
by all of them): Let W1 = W2 = ∅, D1 = { :bb , :¬b¬b } and
D2 = {
b:c
c ,
¬b:c
c }. There are two extensions, in both of
which c is proved, but W1 |∼D1 γ only for γ ≡ TRUE.
Better interpolation theorems may hold (e.g., theorems
that do not depend on cons(D2), pre(D1), etc., and pro-
vide γ ∈ L(〈W1, D1〉) ∩ L(〈W2, D2〉)), if we consider
the entailment between two default theories (〈W1, D1〉 |∼
〈W2, D2〉). These are outside the scope of this paper.
Finally, Corollary 4.7 and Theorem 4.5 are similar to
the splitting theorem of [Turner, 1996], which is provided
for default theories with W = ∅ (there is a modular
translation that converts every default theory to one with
W = ∅). We briefly review this result. A splitting set
for a set of defaults D is a subset A of L(D) such that
pre(D), just(D), cons(D) ⊆ L(A) ∪ L(L(D) \ A) and
∀d ∈ D (cons(d) /∈ L(L(D) \ A) ⇒ L(d) ⊆ A).
Let B = L(D) \ A. The base of D relative to A is
bA(D) = {d ∈ D | L(d) ⊆ A). For a set of sentences
X ⊆ L(A), we define
eA(D,X) =
{∧
({ai}i≤n∩L(B)):{bi}i≤m∩L(B)
c
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∧
n
i=1
ai:b1,...,bm
c ∈ D \ bA(D),
∀i ≤ n(ai ∈ L(A)⇒ ai ∈ CnA(X)),
∀i ≤ m(¬bi /∈ CnA(X))


Theorem 4.8 ([Turner, 1996]) Let A be a splitting set for
a default theory D over L(U). A set E of formulae is a
consistent extension of D iff E = CnL(D)(X ∪ Y ), for
some consistent extension X of ba(D) over L(A) and Y a
consistent extension of eA(D,X) over L(L(D) \A).
Roughly speaking, this theorem finds an extensionX of the
base (bA(D)) and converts D \ bA(D) using this X into
a theory eA(D,X). Then, an extension Y for eA(D,X)
completes the extension for D if X ∪ Y is consistent. In
contrast, our theorem does not change D \ bA(D), but it
is somewhat weaker, in that it only provides a necessary
condition for D |∼b ϕ. (however, notice that this weaker
form is typical for interpolation theorems).
5 Logic Programs
In this section we provide interpolation theorems for logic
programs with the stable models semantics. We use the fact
the logic programs are a special case of default logic, and
the results are straightforward.
An extended disjunctive logic pro-
gram [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988,
Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1990, Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991,
Przymusin´ski, 1991] is a set of rules. Each rule, r, is
written as an expression of the form
L1|...|Ll ← A1, ..., An, notB1, ..., notBm
whereL1, ..., Ll, A1, ..., An, B1, ..., Bm are literals, that is,
atomic formulae or their (classic) negations, L1, ..., Ll are
the head literals, head(r), A1, ..., An are the positive sub-
goals, pos(r), and B1, ..., Bm are the negated subgoals,
neg(r).
A programP is positive if none of its rules includes negated
subgoals. A set of literals, X , is closed under a positive
program, P , if, for every rule r ∈ P such that pos(r) ⊆ X ,
head(r) ∩ X 6= ∅. A set of literals is logically closed if
it consistent or contains all literals. An answer set for a
positive program, P is a minimal set of literals that is both
closed under P and logically closed.
For an arbitrary logic program, P , and a set of literals, X ,
we say that X is an answer set for a program P if X is an
answer set for PX , where PX is defined to include a rule
r′ iff neg(r′) = ∅ and there is r ∈ P such that head(r′) =
head(r), pos(r′) = pos(r), and neg(r) ∩X = ∅.
Logic programs with answer-set semantics were shown
equivalent to default logic in several ways. For normal rules
(rules of the form A ← B1, ..., Bm, not C1, ..., not Cn,
where A,B1, ..., Bm, C1, ..., Cn are atoms (i.e.,
no disjunction or classic negation is allowed)),
[Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991] translated every normal
rule of the form A ← B1, ..., Bm, not C1, ..., not Cn,
into a default
B1 ∧ ... ∧Bm : ¬C1, ...,¬Cn
A
.
Under this mapping, the stable models of a logic program
coincide with the extensions of the corresponding default
theory (Facts in the logic program are translated to facts in
the default theory, while rules are translated to defaults).
[Sakama and Inoue, 1993] showed that disjunctive logic
programs (no classic negation) with the stable model se-
mantics can be translated to prerequisite-free default theo-
ries as follows:
1. For a rule A1|...|Al ←
B1, ..., Bm, not C1, ..., not Cn in P , we get
the default
: ¬C1, ...,¬Cn
B1 ∧ ... ∧Bm ⇒ A1 ∨ ... ∨ Al
2. For each atom A appearing in P , we get the default
:¬A
¬A
Each stable model of P is the set of atoms in some ex-
tension of DP , and the set of atoms in an extension
of DP is a stable model of P (notice that, in general,
an extension of DP can include sentences that are not
atoms and are not subsumed by atoms in that extension).
[Sakama and Inoue, 1993] provide a similar translation to
extended disjunctive logic programs by first translating
those into disjunctive logic programs (a literal ¬A is trans-
lated to a new symbol,A′), showing that a similar property
holds for this class of programs.
We define P |∼ ϕ as cautious entailment sanctioned from
the logic program P , i.e., ϕ follows from stable model of
P . We define P |∼b ϕ as brave entailment sanctioned from
the logic programP , i.e., ϕ follows from at least one stable
model of P .
From the last translation above we get the following inter-
polation theorems.
Theorem 5.1 (Interpolation for Stable Models (Cautious))
Let P be a logic program and let ϕ be a formula such that
P |∼ ϕ. Then, there is a formula γ ∈ L(P ) ∩ L(ϕ) such
that P |∼ γ and γ |= ϕ.
PROOF Follows immediately from Theorem 4.2 with γ2
over there corresponding to our needed γ.
Theorem 5.2 (Interpolation for Stable Models (Brave))
Let P1, P2 be logic programs such that head(P2) ∩
body(P1) = ∅. Let ϕ ∈ L(P2) be a formula such that
P1∪P2 |∼b ϕ. Then, there is a formula γ ∈ L(P1)∩L(P2)
such that P1 |∼b γ and γ ∪ P2 |∼b ϕ.
PROOF Follows directly from the reduction into default
logic and Corollary 4.7.
The last theorem is similar to the splitting theorem of
[Lifschitz and Turner, 1994]. This theorem finds an answer
set X of the bottom (P1) and converts P2 using this X into
a program P ′2. Then, an answer set Y for P ′2 completes
the answer set for P1 ∪ P2 if X ∪ Y is consistent. In con-
trast, our theorem does not change P2, but it is somewhat
weaker, in that it does only provides a necessary condition
for P1 ∪ P2 |∼b ϕ (this is the typical form of an interpola-
tion theorem).
6 Summary
We presented interpolation theorems that are applicable to
the nonmonotonic systems of circumscription, default logic
and Answer Set Programming (a.k.a. Stable Models Se-
mantics). These results are somewhat surprising and re-
vealing in that they show particular structure for the non-
monotonic entailments associated with the different sys-
tems. They promise to help in reasoning with larger sys-
tems that are based on these nonmonotonic systems.
Several questions remain open. First, γ promised by our
theorems is not always finite (in the FOL case). This is in
contrast to classical FOL, where the interpolant is always
of finite length. What conditions guarantee that it is finite in
our setup? We conjecture that this will require the partial
order involved in the circumscription to be smooth. Sec-
ond, are there better interpolation theorems for the priori-
tized case of those systems? Also, what is the shape of the
interpolation theorems specific for prerequisite-free semi-
normal defaults? Further, our results for default logic and
logic programs are propositional. How do they extend to
the FOL case?
Finally, the theorems for default logic and Logic Program-
ming promise that α |∼D β implies the existence of γ such
that α |∼D γ and γ |∼D β. However, we do not know that
the other direction holds, i.e., that the existence of γ such
that α |∼D γ and γ |∼D β implies that α |∼D β. Can we
do better than Theorem 4.6 for different cases?
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